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Vermeire: "Deprogramming": From the Defense Counsel's Perspective

"DEPROGRAMMING": FROM THE
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERSPECTIVE
ALBERT R. VERMEIRE*

We begin with the propositionthat the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all A system which secures the right to
proselytize religious,political and ideologicalcauses must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrainfrom speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.'
Anguished parents and sympathetic judges; concerned attorneys and psychologists; reality-inducing therapists, police officers and adult or minor conservatees and wards: All play integral roles in federal civil rights and state tort religious cult
litigation. Characteristically, such actions are brought in the
name of the ward or conservatee who was the subject of a temporary guardianship or conservatorship, empowering a guardian
or conservator to have his or her child counseled by psychiatrists, psychologists or lay therapists, and issued by a court
convinced that the child had become a victim of a form of mind
control manifested by abrupt personality changes, radical behavioral modification, unexplained divesting of assets, and
general physical debilitation. The counseling, often referred to
as deprogramming, 2 is either interrupted or unsuccessfully completed and the ward or conservatee returns to the cult. Soon
after the ward's return, federal litigation is commenced, with
jurisdiction premised upon both diversity3 and federal question.'
* Partner, Monbleau, Vermeire & Turley, Phoenix, Arizona; B.A., 1969

University of Virginia; J.D., 1972 University of Arizona.
I Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
2 Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.,
Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981); Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va.
1980), rev'd, No. 80-1336 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1981); Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp.
717, 721 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978) (unpublished opinion), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1966 & Supp. 1981).
1 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1966 & Supp. 1981).
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Causes are pleaded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1 1985(2),G
1985(3),' 1988,8 and the various state common law torts of false
I Every

person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1974 & Supp. 1981).
8 If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the
United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party
or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended
or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of
any grand jury or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror
in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been
such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due
course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any
citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property
for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person,
or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(2) (1974 & Supp. 1981).
1 If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of
the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from
giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of
the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President
or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or
advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
delrived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned
by such injury or deprivation, against any one or morp of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (1974 & Supp. 1981).
8 The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection
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imprisonment, false arrest, assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional harm.
Due to its controversial nature and its attraction of many
commentators to investigate the first amendment questions surrounding the use of this therapy, deprogramming has been
analyzed in various articles, notes and comments. However,
they have only cursorily examined the procedural and substantive predicates to proving claims under the federal Civil Rights
Statutes and the relevant state common law torts. While
scholarly, these articles have either analyzed deprogramming in
conjunction with brainwashing or totalism,9 investigated
deprogramming as a method of conversion '°, analogized cultist
beliefs with the first amendment religious beliefs" or have atof all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction
of punishment on the party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by
or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a
violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C.A.41988 (1974 & Supp. 1981). Amended effective October 1, 1981 by
deleting "or in any civil action or proceeding by or on behalf of the United States
of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue Code," see Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2330 (1980).
R. Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under
the FirstAmendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977).
"I LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAm L.
REv. 599 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as LeMoult, DeprogrammingMembers of

Religious Sects].
" Note, "Mind Control"or Intensity of Faitk: The ConstitutionalProtection
of Religious Beliefs, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751 (1978) [hereinafter referred to
as Note, "Mind Control']; Comment, The Deprogramming of Religious Sect
Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section 1985(3), 74 Nw. L. REV. 229
(1979) [hereinafter referred to as Comment, The Deprogramming of Religious
Sect Members]; Comment. Federal Statutory Remedy Rejected for Religious
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tempted to formulate a theory of free exercise of religion that
would apply to beliefs of religious cult members."
Drawing on the perspective and background of research into
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act in which 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and § 1985 are embodied and having handled numerous
federal trial and appellate cases that have yielded opinions
delimiting the standards by which religious cult claims must be
proved and pleaded, the author will concentrate on recent
developments in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the federal district and appellate courts. This article will explore
the requirements of stating a cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §
1985, the test of pleading and proving a conspiracy under these
sections, defenses available to the practitioner who must
counter claims of first amendment violations and emotional injury, and will conclude with an overview of the present state of
the law surrounding religious cult litigation and the civil rights
damages available in such cases.

I. A REALISTIC DEFINITION OF DEPROGRAMMING
Early efforts by various legal authors to define deprogramming were for the most part based on undocumented accounts of
the experience by persons who were or soon would be plaintiffs
in damage actions brought against the deprogrammers. Most
commentators have chosen to define deprogramming as a
calculated method to disabuse a person of religious beliefs. 3
Kidnapping Victim, Baer v. Baer, 11 CONN. L. REv. 773 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Comment, FederalStatutory Remedy Rejected].
2 Note, Conservatorships and Religous Cults: Divining a Theory of Free
Exercise, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1247 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults].
I Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelinesfor CriminalActivities,
Tort Liability and Parental Remedies, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1025 (1977);
LeMoult, DeprogrammingMembers of Religious Sects, supra note 10, at 599: "It
is called 'deprogramming'. It consists of taking adherents of religious groups
against their wills, confining them, and subjecting them to intense, mental and
emotional and sometimes physical pressures until they renounce their religious
affiliation." In Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the decision
was based on defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(c). As such, the well-pleaded facts in the complaint were assumed to be
true for purposes of the motion and thus the court accepted the plaintiffs definition of deprogramming as a process whereby "individuals who are members of
certain religious groups are subjected to a scheme of brain-washing or mind control in an attempt to dissuade them of their religious beliefs." 450 F. Supp. at 485.
See note 62 infra.
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These definitions were based on articles in newspapers 4 and
magazines 5 and even the affidavit of a plaintiff's attorney based
on his client's version of the experience."
In Weiss v. Patrick,' the court sitting without a jury found
the credible evidence to be that the process of deprogramming
involves no treatable or apparent physical injury and fails to
support a claim that the process inflicts traumatic psychic or
emotional injury.'" In Weiss, the court found that the defendants
had the right to peaceably dissuade the plaintiff from any particular view, whether religious or not, so long as there was no
" Note, Conservatorshipsand Religious Cults, supra note 12, at 1247 n.3;
LeMoult, DeprogrammingMembers of Religious Sects, supra note 10, at 600 nn.
6 & 7; id. at n. 11; Comment, FederalStatutory Remedy Rejected, supra note 11,
at 774 n.3.
1" Such source materials have included The Nation, cited in Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults, supra note 12, at 1248 n.8; Women's Day and
Children Today, cited in LeMoult, DeprogrammingMembers of Religious Sects,
supra note 10, at 600 n.5; and U.S. News & World Report, cited in Note, Legal
Issues in the Use of GuardianshipProcedures to Remove Members of Cults, 18
ARIz. L. REV. 1095, 1095 n.4. (1976).
N Note, Conservatorshipsand Religious Cults, supra note 12, at 1248 n.8.
The attorney, described as a person "who has represented several persons 'subjected' to deprogramming described the experience in an affidavit the plaintiffs
attempted to introduce in the case of In re Guardianship of Walter Robert Taylor,
No. P-76-1228 (Okla. County P. Ct. August 12, 1976). The attorney (or his unnamed
client) described a "long interrogation as to their belief", abusive comment and
the vilification of the cultist's religious leaders. He alleged sleep deprivation and
the shutting off of news from the outside world until the individual will of the person was broken. Id.
The author was defense counsel at all stages of the proceedings in Taylor v.
Gilmartin, 434 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (preliminary injunction denied). The
affidavit of other counsel relied upon by the commentator in support of his definition of deprogramming was summarily dismissed by the trial court as completely
incompetent. The Taylor civil rights damages case was tried in January, 1981,
and a verdict in favor of all defendants was returned. Taylor v. Gilmartin, No.
CIV-77-0351-D (W.D. Okla. Jan. 16, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1215 (10th Cir.
Feb. 25, 1981) Compare Comment, The Deprogrdmming of Religious Sect
Members, supra note 11, at 237 n.56 ("most deprogrammings involve abductions")
with Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978) and Baer v. Baer, 450 F.
Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also note 25 infra. Even a cursory reading of these
two opinions reveals that the ward was taken into custody on the authority of a
court order with the assistance of local law enforcement officials. One should
doubt seriously the assertion that the majority of deprogrammings involve abductions.
" 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), affd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978) (unpublished
opinion), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
"' Id. at 721.
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form of unlawful compulsion to effect that purpose. The court
further found that the plaintiff was encouraged to listen to
another point of view, given adequate food and sleep and, rather
than characterize the plaintiff's departure as an "escape","
found that the plaintiff was "determined to exit dramatically."2
What is at the heart of Wesss is that while deprogrammers
do indeed intend to offer a different point of view and to persuade the cultist to change his or her mind, such conduct is itself
protected by the first amendment right to freedom of speech
and entitled to the same protection as is any other first amendment rightY In essence, the Weiss rationale is that "the right of
every person 'to be left alone' must be placed in the scales with
the right of others to communicate." 2
In January of 1981, a jury verdict was returned in favor of a
judicially authorized counseling psychologist, attorneys representing the parents of a ward, and the deprogrammers of a young
man who claimed affiliation with both Hindu and American Old
Catholic Church religions.3 In directing a verdict in favor of the
defendants on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional
harm, the court ruled as a matter of law that deprogramming,
being a form of communication, exchange of ideas and interaction between two or more persons, could not constitute outrageous conduct nor could it be described as "going beyond the
bounds of decency. "24
19Id.
2Id.

21

Id. at 722: "To hold otherwise would be to deny Defendants their First

Amendment right to freedom of speech, one of the very rights which Plaintiff

herself asserts as the basis for her civil rights claim." The court relied on the
Supreme Court's dictates in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), wherein
it was held that in spite of the probability of excess and abuse, the freedom and
liberty to persuade others to one's own point of view, although based upon exaggeration, vilification or even false statement, is just as essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of citizens of a democracy as is the right to

be left alone. 310 U.S. at 310.
' Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D.R.I. 1978), citing, Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dept. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Clearly the remedy to such a
person is to refuse to listen. See, e.g., Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285
(E.D. Va. 1974).
1 No. CIV-77-0351-D (W.D. Okla. Jan. 16, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1215
(10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1981). A previous ruling on the denial of a preliminary injunction is reported at 434 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
24 Id.
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At the heart of deprogramming is a form of communication:
conversation which the ward in most cases wishes not to hear,
and may attempt to shut out by either not listening or by interrupting through use of chanting or silent prayer. While the
offering of contradictory ideas or rhetoric may be offensive to
the listener, it is highly questionable whether the expression of
a point of view can ever rise to the level of an actionable cause.
The questioning of a belief, whether political, social or religious,
does not necessarily constitute a wrong under applicable federal
or state statutes. Clearly, the mere questioning of a foundation
for a purported belief and the offering of antithetical theories
does not rise to the level of outrageous conduct or the intentional infliction of emotional harm. It is the infringement of a
religious belief that is protected by the the first amendment.
The statutory embodiment of the right of free exercise is found
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 although some commentators have now urged the protection of such a right under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as well.
II.

THE SECTION 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION

The fulcrum upon which every religious cult-deprogramming
case rests in federal court is the section 1983 cause of action.'
This section is all-inclusive in its protection of rights, privileges
and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Stating a claim under this statute avoids therefore the serious obstacles to stating a claim under section
1985(3)2 where idehtifying both the source of congressional
power to enact the law as well as the rights intended to be protected under that section has often proven very difficult.' Of
course, practitioners plead a cause of action under section
1985(3) in addition to pleading a cause under section 1983
" Each of the reported federal cases concerning cult deprogramming has
proceeded, at least in part, on a Section 1983 theory: Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d
844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981);
Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Orlando v. Wizel, 443 F. Supp. 744
(W.D. Ark. 1978); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973); but see
Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978) (unpublished opinion), cert.denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) and Ward v. Connor, 495 F.
Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-1336 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1981) (Section 1985
theories).
See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., the court's analysis in Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 489-92
(N.D. Cal. 1978).
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because a party who cannot withstand the burden of proving
that the action was taken under color of state law may be able to
successfully attack purely private action if the discrimination is
either racial in nature
or intended to interfere with the right of
28
interstate travel.
The fundamental requirement of proving a claim under section 1983 is a demonstration that the defendants have acted
under color of state law or authority. There has been no pattern
in the cult deprogramming cases which would indicate a trend
towards naming the judge who issues the order as a defendant.
Unless the judge has acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction," the naming of the judge is most likely futile and unnecessary from a substantive standpoint since co-conspirators
may be held liable even if the judicial officer is immune."
A.

The Role of the Judge

In those cases where the deprogramming is carried out pursuant to a court order of guardianship or conservatorship, the
decision to name the judge as a defendant turns on two key
questions: (1) Are the acts being complained of truly "judicial"
acts, and, if they are, (2) were the judge's actions undertaken in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
In Stump v. Sparkman,31 the Supreme Court extended
judicial immunity to a judge who had approved a petition for involuntary sterilization of a "somewhat retarded"32 15-year-old
girl. The petition had been presented by the girl's natural
mother, but the prospective subject had been given no notice of
the nature of the petition. Justice White, writing for the majority, focused on the question of whether the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter and held that absolute immunity
28

Id.

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978).
As Judge Williams pointed out in Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 488 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), assuming that the plaintiff could amend his complaint to allege a conspiracy between the judge and the defendants, he would still have to allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate that the court acted "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." With or without the judge as a party defendant, the lay co-conspirator may
be held liable and are not entitled to the umbrella of absolute judicial immunity.
See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
31 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
' This was alleged by the mother in the petition. Id. at 351.
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should be extended in this case since there was no demonstration that the court had acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction."' Justice White noted that a judge would not be deprived
of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of the court's authority. Evidently
there was no consensus reached between all parties to the litigation that the approval and the execution of the petition was indeed a judicial act. In the briefs presented before the Court,
however, much emphasis was placed on the totally ex parte
nature of the proceeding and on the secrecy and covertness with
which the court order was approved. 4 The failure of the
litigants to argue this issue is significant to the question of
whether actions undertaken prior to the execution of the order
by the court, such as bribery, prejudicial agreements and secret
contracts, can qualify as a "judicial act" and therefore satisfy
the first prong of the immunity test.
In Stump v. Sparkman, it was held that because the court'
over which the judge presided was one of general jurisdiction, neither lack of specific statutory authority nor procedural
errors he may have committed in an effort to execute the petition rendered him liable in damages. 5 Justice White characterized
the absence of a docket number, the failure to place the petition
on file in the clerk's office and the maintenance of an ex parte
proceeding without notice to the ward, without a hearing and
without the appointment of a guaradian ad litem as mere lack of
formality which did not divest the act of its judicial character.
What was significant to the Supreme Court was the act in question, rather than any pre-execution secret agreements or meetings between the participants. What rendered this conduct a
"judicial" act was the determination that it was a function "normally performed by a judge" and "a function [conforming] to the
3

Id at 357, citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872).

" Brief for Respondents, at 3, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1977).
Justice White thought the only act questioned to be a "judicial act" was the approval of the petition. 435 U.S. at 362. Stewart, J., dissenting, was concerned that
there was no case or controversy, no litigants and not even a pretext of principled
decision-making. He would have found that the act was non-judicial because of the
total absence of any of the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding. Id. at 369.
The Court in no way dealt with the question of whether there was an informal
and prior agreement with the judge to grant the petition upon presentation.
435 U.S. at 359.
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expectations of the parties, ie., whether they dealt with the
judge in his judicial capacity."3
Opposing advocates in the cult deprogramming damage
cases read with interest the enticing footnotes to the majority
and dissenting opinions in Stump v. Sparkman inviting resolution of a split of authority among the federal circuits on the
question of the extension of the court's absolute immunity to
persons allegedly acting in concert with the court but not
themselves state agents. 7 Shortly after the Supreme Court's
opinion, the District Court for Arizona employed the "clear
absence of all jurisdiction" test and held in Rankin v. Howard
that the acts of the defendant judge in issuing the temporary
order of guardianship over the cult member were judicial in
nature and based upon proper subject matter jurisdiction. 8 The
court rejected the argument that it was necessary to find personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff in order to find immunity for
the judge. 9 The court then extended the Ninth Circuit point of
view extending such immunity to co-conspirators who allegedly
acted in concert and in participation with the judge."
While the Rankin appeal was pending before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit two opinions paved
the way to the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue. On remand in Sparkman v. McFarlin," the judges in regular active
Id. at 362.
The majority concluded: "The issue is not presented and we do not decide
whether the District Court correctly concluded that the federal claims against the
other defendants were required to be dismissed if Judge Stump, the only state
agent, was found to be absolutely immune." 435 U.S. 349, 364 n.13 (1978); Compare Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahhorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1976) with Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970).
The dissenters also showed self-restraint:
The only question before us in this case is the scope of judicial immunity. How the absence of a 'judicial act' might affect the issue of whether
Judge Stump was acting 'under color of' state law within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, or the issue of whether his act was that of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment are, therefore, not
questions that need be pursued here.
435 U.S. 349, 369 n.6 (1978).
1 Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 73 (D. Ariz. 1978) rev'd, 633 F.2d 844
(9th Cir. 1980), cert denied sub nom., Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981).
39Id.
40 Id,
" Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), complaint dismissed on remand
subnom. Sparkman v McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
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service in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit voted to resolve the issue en banc and held that the complaint failed to state a claim against the private individuals
where it failed to particularize the acts of conspiracy so as to
draw the sufficient nexus between the conduct of the judge and
the participation of the mother, the attorney who drafted the
petition, the doctors who performed or assisted in the sterilization, and the hospital where the tubal ligation was performed. A
radically divided court in a plurality opinion failed to resolve
definitively the extension of immunity question. The eight Circuit Court judges had the opportunity to answer the question on
remand either by applying the test of sufficiency of pleading to
prove a conspiracy or by addressing the split among the federal
circuits on the question of extension of immunity.
In a concurring opinion, however, it was noted that while
the "requisite particularity in alleging a conspiracy" rule would
be followed in this circuit, if the factual particulars of a conspiracy could be alleged under a fairly strict standard, private
persons would be exposed to section 1983 liability by conspiring
with absolutely immune judges.42 After discusssing the policy
considerations for and against extension of the per se immunity
accorded to judges, the opinion concluded by finding that the
Seventh Circuit rule was "flexible enough to accommodate and
mediate all of the policy considerations on both sides of the
question."43
The dissent found that courts previously addressing the
issue confused immunity with state action, and would have held
that there was state action irrespective of a public official's immunity where the action is one for civil damages. The dissenters
did not feel that the purposes of judicial immunity would be
undermined or that the allowance of such suits would have a
chilling effect on the ability of a judge to perform his duties with
independence and without fear of adverse consequence. The
possibility of judges having to testify and be subject to other
discovery procedures, though not parties to the action, was
dismissed as a "slight inconvenience and embarrassment" and
42 601 F.2d at 266. The concurrence reasoned that "the conferral of immunity
upon the judge defendant does not destroy the judicial state action which the
judge may have performed:'

Id. at 267.
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nugatory." In the same year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit plurality apparently agreed in Sparks
v. Duval County Ranch Co., Inc."
The key act in the Sparks case was the entering of an injunction, although much importance was also placed in the appellate rehearing opinion on the fact that one of the defendants
bribed the judge to issue the injunction prohibiting the plaintiffs
from producing certain oil, and that two other defendants, with
full knowledge of the alleged conspiracy, acted as sureties on
the injunction bond. Although the act of bribery occurred prior
to the time of the undertaking of any judicial act, the plurality
opinion simply concluded: "Carrillo [the judge] was, of course unqualifiedly immune from suit for damages occasioned by his
judicial act, and as to him the suit was correctly dismissed."4
The United States Supreme Court tacitly agreed with such a
finding in dicta indicating that although the official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving
bribery, the judge himself was correctly held to be immune from
damages. Such immunity did not however change the character
of the judge's action or that of alleged co-conspirators.47

"

Id- at 274 n.9.

45604 F.2d 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1979).
"

Id. at 978.

Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S. Ct. 183 (1980), aff'g, 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979).
Justice White, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
The courts below concluded that the judicial immunity doctrine required dismissal of the § 1983 action against the judge who issued the
challenged injunction, and as the case comes to us, the judge has been
properly dismissed from the suit on immunity grounds. It does not
follow, however, that the action against the private parties accused of
conspiring with the judge must also be dismissed.
Id. at 186. This was an interesting statement by Justice White in light of the fact
that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari only on the issue of derivative immunity, 445 U.S. 92 (1980), but expressly denied certiorari on the issue of judicial
immunity. "As the case came" to the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit had held
that the judge was "unqualifiedly immune." The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has gone further than the Supreme Court by taking into consideration the alleged non-judicial character of a prior agreement which eventually leads to the issuance of an order within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
court, Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980), thereby seizing on
the dictum in Dennis v. Sparks which implicitly confired that the Fifth Circuit
had properly upheld the State judge's dismissal. See generally note 55 and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit panel rehearing opinion came about as a
result of the entry of an order by the then majority of judges in
active service in the circuit who voted to reconsider en banc the
previous holding of the panel affirming the dismissal of the complaint as to the private alleged co-conspirators. Indeed, the
clerk's notice to counsel made specific mention of the intervening opinion in Stump v. Sparkman and the invitation to resolve
this issue expressed in footnote thirteen to the majority opinion
in Stump:48 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit found
that the issue of derivative immunity of private persons who
allegedly conspired with the judge was properly before it and it
would not sidestep the issue based on the particularlized pleading rule. The essential differences between the plurality and dissenting opinions in the Fifth Circuit was the weight given by the
respective authors to the two positions respecting the likely
degree of infringement on the orderly and proper exercise of the
judicial function should the court, technically immune, be required to explain the basis for its decisions in depositions and
other discovery procedures.49
" The Clerk's letter to counsel stated in pertinent part: "[I]n other words the
Court wishes to reconsider the holding that Judge Carillo's alleged co-conspirators-the private citizens-effectively share his immunity, since 'they did not
conspire with a person against whom a valid § 1983 can be stated."' See Stump v.
Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 364 n.13 (1978) and Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co.,
Inc., 604 F.2d 976, 979 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979). Judge Gee, writing for the plurality in
Sparks, stated: "Mischievous damage suits of this sort license the ill-disposed to
require judges to appear and testify. But the benefit that the derivative immunity
would accord in protecting judges from an obligation to testify in the trial of their
alleged co-conspirators, while not wholly illusory, is comparatively insignificant."
604 F.2d at 980. Coleman & Ainsworth, JJ., dissented and took strong exception
to the suggestion of the comparative insignificance of possible forced testimony
by judges and characterized this finding as a "very small portion of the iceberg."
Id. at 985. The dissenters were concerned that any individual who had lost a case
and who knew how to sufficiently plead enough misconduct to withstand a motion
to dismiss, without consideration given to the merits of the complaint, could force
the judge or the prosecutor to besmear their integrity. The judge is not a party
defendant so he would not be entitled to trial participation as a party litigant. If
he wished such participation, he would have to move to intervene, thus "surId The court would
rendering the cornerstone of his judicial independence ....
have to employ its own counsel. If he did not become a party defendant, he could
not guarantee himself the right to testify in behalf of his own vindication. What
most concerned the dissenters was that the imaginative litigant and his counsel
could achieve by the back door of discovery what they could never achieve directly
because of the court's immunity. Id. at 986.
" The dissenters felt that such discovery was without precedent, would
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The Supreme Court of the United States had no trouble in
resolving the conflict surrounding the anticipated incursion on
the judge's role and duties. The Court found that it did not
follow that actions against private individuals need necessarily
be dismissed on immunity grounds even if the only state actor
were absolutely immune. Justice White made it clear that the
requirement of acting "under color of state law" for section 1983
purposes did not require that the defendant be a state officer,
but that it was enough if he was a "willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents."5 The prerequisite in this case
was found to be the allegation of a corrupt conspiracy involving
bribery, since, as noted by the Court, mere resort to the court
and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make that
party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.5 The only
exception the Court noted it might recognize was that the
immunity would extend to any private party who "was actually
performing a judicial act or was in any sense an official aide of
the judge."52
Finding that there was no constitutionally-based privilege
that would protect the judge from responding to questions
about his judicial activities and decisions at the damage trial of
the private persons who allegedly conspired with him, the
Supreme Court agreed that testifying takes time and energy
that might otherwise be devoted to the courtroom and, indeed,
the integrity of the judge and of the entire judicial process
might be at stake in such cases." Basically, Justice White could
simply not find any statutory or common law authority exempting a judge from testifying as a witness when he had information material to a civil proceeding. Thus, in federal district court
litigation where all the circuits require pretrial order compliance at the completion of discovery, assuming the "where,
when and how" rules of proving a conspiracy can he demonstrated, it is likely that the judge who issued the order of guardianship or conservatorship in cult deprogramming cases will
have to testify as a witness unless the federal district judge
begin a trend very injurious to the judicial system, and "that destruction of many
a massive dike began with a very small leak." 604 F.2d at 984.
W Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S. Ct.
at 186.
5' Id.
53

Id at 187.
Id-
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believes that such testimony will result in an undue interference
with the state judicial system.54
After the granting of the petition for certiorari in Dennis v.
Sparks, but before the opinion was handed down on November
17, 1980, Rankin v. Howard was argued before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court applied the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Dennis and held that neither the
district court judge, the counsel for the parents, nor the deprogrammers were immune from section 1983 liability.5 In light of
the Supreme Court's findings in Dennis v. Sparks, the holding as
against the private individuals was not surprising but the reasoning used to find the judge liable as a defendant was. Like the
case of Baer v. Baer,56 Rankin concerned a motion where the
well-pleaded facts in the complaint were either taken as true or
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." The plaintiff alleged that prior to the presentation of the
temporary guardianship petition, the judge privately agreed in
advance with the other private persons that he would issue the
order of guardianship although he knew he had no jurisdiction
to do so.
The Ninth Circuit found that there was not the clear
absence of all subject matter jurisdiction but wrestled with the
question of whether the "clear absence" test applied to personal
jurisdiction as well. Noting that the question appeared to be one
of first impression, Judge Wright extended the test so that a
judge who knowingly acted "in the clear and complete absence
of personal jurisdiction loses his judicial immunity."" That is to
say, the Ninth Circuit stressed the allegation that the judge
knew he lacked jurisdiction and that Kansas law, according to
the plaintiff's contentions, expressly prohibited the defendant
judge from exercising jurisdiction over the prospective ward.
The Court went on to hold that if as alleged the judge knew that
" Id. at 188 n.7: "Whether the Federal Courts should be especially alert to
avoid undue interference with the state judicial system flowing from demands
upon state judges to appear as witnesses need not be addressed at this time."
Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.,
Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981).
450 F. Supp. 41 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
, FED.R. Civ. P. 56(c); See, e.g., Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550
F.2d 992 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 849.
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the jurisdictional allegations of the residence of the ward were
fraudulent, or if the applicable Kansas law did expressly foreclose personal jurisdiction over a proposed ward in an ex parte
proceeding, then it could be found that the judge acted in a clear
and complete absence of personal jurisdiction. 9
The curious aspect of Rankin is reconciling the finding
therein that a private agreement in anticipation of the issuance
of the order to act favorably thereon was not a judicial act,"0
with the Supreme Court's finding in Dennis v. Sparks that the
judge who was allegedly bribed prior to the issuance of the
injunction had been "properly dismissed from the suit on
immunity grounds."'" The "act" challenged in each case was one
normally done by a judge: issuing court orders in Rankin for
temporary guardianship, and in Dennis, for sterilization.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court's fear of undermining
the judge's independence in his judicial role by discovery
devices inquiring into the bases of his opinions, rulings, and decisions will not be borne out in the cult deprogramming damage
cases. Needless to say, however, imaginative and inventive
plaintiff's attorneys can draft artful pleadings which can defeat
any motion to dismiss as to the section 1983 cause of action since
all the well-pleaded facts in the complaint are assumed to be
true.62 This means that any disgruntled litigant, through a pro" Id The court relied upon Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351 (1872),
wherein it was stated that: "When the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge,
no excuse is permissible ......
"Although a party conniving with a judge to predetermine the outcome of
a judicial proceeding may deal with him in his 'judicial capacity,' the othpr party's
expectation, ie., judicial impartiality, is actively frustrated by the scheme. In any
event, the agreement is not 'a function normally performed by a judge."' 633 F.2d
at 847.
' Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S.Ct. at 186. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a
judge's private, prior agreement to decide in favor of one party was simply not a
judicial act. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 847. There is no analytical difference
between a secret meeting and agreement in advance of the presentation of a petition for sterilization, a bribe completed prior to the presentation of a motion for
preliminary injunction insuring the issuance of the order, and a private, prior
agreement to decide in favor of a parent presenting a petition for an order of temporary guardianship, that would reasonably explain Judge Wright's conclusion
that such a prior arrangement is simply not a judicial act.and therefore unworthy
of immunity.
' This is true both for motions to dismiss, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)-(6) and motions for judgment on the pleadings, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c). As to motions for summary judgment brought pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), the facts are viewed in
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perly pleaded conspiracy count in conjunction with a section
1983 cause of action, will be able to depose the judge even before
the complaint can be challenged by way of summary judgment.
The only and most important control that can be placed upon
such practice is for the federal courts
to very strictly enforce
3
the particularized pleading rule.1
B. Liability of Attorneys, Conservators and Guardians,Police
Officials, and Deprogrammers
As the Supreme Court noted in Dennis v. Sparks, mere
resort to the courts in an effort to seek a remedy does not constitute the requisite state action or active participation with a
state official sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Absent a successful conspiracy theory, there is simply no basis
for alleging a cause under color of state law against attorneys
who counsel parents, or apply to the courts for orders of guardianship or conservatorship, and who carry out their duties assisting parents as guardians or conservators pursuant to the ensuing court order. 4 Only when the private individual is clothed
with the authority of the state, i.e., when his actions are
substantially identical to those taken by state officials, can state
action under section 1983 be found.65 Only if the individual
possesses the power the ordinary citizen does not possess
"which allows the individual [defendant] to take actions normally
associated with those taken by public officials acting on behalf of
the state ..... " does the lay person become "clothed" with such
authority." Indeed, the federal courts have aptly stated that the
"requirement of 'State action' can rarely be satisfied when the
action is taken by one not a State official." 7
In cult deprogramming damage cases, the attorney's function consists of: counseling parents, preparing pleadings, appearthe light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970); See also Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975).
See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S.Ct. at 186; Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d at 850,
cert. denied sub noma., Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981).
0 Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 485-86 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Dennis v. Hein, 413
F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (D.S.C. 1976); DeCarlo v. Joseph Horne & Co., 251 F. Supp.
935, 936 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (D.S.C. 1976).
07 Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (emphasis added); See also Dobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966).
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ing before the court and arguing his client's case, preparing a
form of order of guardianship or conservatorship, presenting an
order directing the sheriff or law enforcement officials in the
county or district to assist in service of the order and, on occasion, obtaining a temporary restraining order to prevent any
disturbance of the peace when the order taking the ward into
custody is served. Not one of these acts can be characterized as
clothing the attorney with the authority of the state such that
his actions become state action. 8
After obtaining the order, the attorney or the parent serving as guardian or conservator will seek the assistance of law
enforcement officials to help effect service of the order and to
avoid any possible breach of the peace. As the Supreme Court
has pointed out, police officers enjoy a qualified immunity for
their acts taken in performance of their official functions. 9 If a
court deems issuance of an order as necessary, it is certainly an
official function of a law enforcement agency to respond to that
court order and to avoid any unnecessary confrontation between
cult members, parents, and attorneys.10
In their capacity as parents, the ward's mother and father
should be treated no differently than psychiatrists, psychologists, religious counselors, lay assistants, or deprogrammers
who communicate with the ward during the term of his guardianship or conservatorship. The mother and father can be viewed
no differently than any other litigants who apply to the court for
relief, because the state merely provides a forum for their legal
action. As to his or her conduct as the conservator or guardian,
however, it could well be argued that in such a role the parent is
actually performing a quasi-judicial act or is in one sense an official aide of the judge and acts in his stead pursuant to the proDennis v. Sparks, 101 S.Ct. at 187; Harley v. Oliver, 539 F.2d 1143, 1145-46
(8th Cir. 1976); Orlando v. Wizel, 443 F. Supp. 744, 751 (W.D. Ark. 1978).
" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), accord, Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158
(9th Cir. 1976).
" The requirement that the duty be official in nature is analogous to the requirement that the act of the judge in question be truly "judicial." See note 35
supra and accompanying text. The act undertaken by the police officer must be in
good faith and based upon a reasonable belief that he is carrying out an official
function. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557. Once it has been established that the
police officer was acting pursuant to those official duties, the burden then shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the officer was not acting in good faith. Milton
v. Nelson, 527 F.2d at 1160.
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bate laws.7' In Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., a petition was filed
without notice to the proposed conservatee for a conservator
to be appointed based upon declarations that the subject was incompetent and the appointment was necessary for the purpose
of consent to surgery, blood transfusions, medicine, and drugs.
Once the ward becomes subject to the powers of the conservator
with specific directions as to the purpose of the order, "[h]is
liability should be no greater or less than the judge who appointed him. ''73 Indeed, in carrying out the direct order of the
court, the conservator or guardian does become an aide of the
court and should be treated no differently than a clerk, bailiff or
marshall. 4 Obviously, the predicate for this argument is that the
guardian in carrying out his specific orders is indeed acting
under color of state law, but is entitled to the same immunity of
the judge who issued the order.
Particularly with respect to section 1983 claims which do not
require a showing of invidiously discriminatory class-based
animus (which per se denotes bad faith), a qualified good faith
immunity is available not only to the judicial officer and his
aides, but to those whose liability under this section is premised
only upon active participation or concerted action with him. This
qualified immunity requires a good faith belief in the legality of
"' This would seem to fulfill the Supreme Court's suggestion in Dennis v.
Sparks that a private party was actually performing a judicial act or was in a
sense an official aide of the court. 101 S.Ct. at 187; see also Kermit Constr. Corp.
v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Burkes v.
Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).
72 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
71 Id. at 131.
7' According to the court,
[it did] not view his situation as any different than that of a United
States Marshal ordered by this Court to remove demonstrators from
the courthouse plaza in violation of their First Amendment rights. Certainly the Marshal's liability and damages to the demonstrators for his
actions under direct order of the Court would have to depend on the
liability, if any, of the Court. Id.
Clerks and bailiffs would clearly come within the Supreme Court's designation of
"official aides." Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S.Ct. at 187; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at
553-54; Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d at 319. Prosecutors are absolutely immune
from suit under the Civil Rights Acts on the strength of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976), based on the Court's belief that to qualify such immunity would
disserve the broader public interest in vigorous and fearless performance of the
prosecutor's duty which is essential to the proper functioning, of the criminal
justice system.
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the action. 75 Although a literal reading of section 1983 would
create the impression that the statute creates liability that "admits of no immunities .... 7 the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions sanctioned qualified immunity for any official actions found to have been taken in good faith."
The "knew or reasonably should have known test" is closely
akin to the common law negligence test. This second tenet of the
requirement denies immunity to any state agent acting "with
malicious intention to cause deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury to the [plaintiff] . .. ."I' Thus, as to the latter
prong of the test, there appears to be a merging with the same
invidious motivation necessary to prove a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3). Indeed, it can no longer be gainsaid that any person
against whom a viable section 1983 count can be stated can and
will defend on the basis of a qualified immunity. It must be emphasized in this regard that but for proof that the private individuals participated in active and knowing concerted action
with the judge, there would, in most cases, be no successful section 1983 claim stated against them.
11O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
"' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 417. The Court went on in Imbler to find
that prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity in carrying out their official
functions. Earlier, in Pierson v. Ray, the Court noted that the 1871 Congress
which passed Section 1983 did not intend "to abolish wholesale all common.law
immunities." 386 U.S. at 554.
Obviously, good faith is unnecessary to successfully invoke the absolute
immunity accorded judges, prosecutors and legislators. As to legislative immunity, see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) and Tenny v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951). Qualified immunity has been extended to a Governor and other
executive officials, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); state hospital superintendents and staff, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); school board
members, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); and police officers, Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The various federal courts of appeals have extended
such qualified immunity to: parole officers, Wolfel v. Sanborn, 555 F.2d 583 (6th
Cir. 1977); jailers, Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
865 (1976); state banking officials, Guzman v. W. State Bank, 540 F.2d 948 (8th Cir.
1976); and correctional administrators, Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir.
1975). If the judge is not absolutely immune, he can avail himself of the doctrine of
qualified immunity. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974); Gregory v.
Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 65 (9th Cir. 1974).
T' Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322.
See notes 83-88 infra and accompanying text where it is discussed that at
the heart of a Section 1985(3) action is the requirement that the plaintiff
demonstrate an invidiously discriminatory class-based animus.
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At least one Justice of the Supreme Court has recently opined
that the majority opinion in Procunier v. Navarette, "when
coupled with O'Connor v. Donaldson, strongly implies that
every defendant in a section 1983 action is entitled to assert a
qualified immunity from damage liability."80 In all damage cases
where a cause of action has been pleaded against private participants in an alleged conspiracy with an absolutely immune or
qualifiedly immune state official, the good faith defense should
be pleaded as an affirmative defense and the defendants should
be prepared to prove that their conduct as well as that of the
judge, the key actor in an alleged conspiracy, was undertaken
neither with the malicious intention to cause deprivation of the
ward's constitutional rights nor with any reasonable expectation
that the action taken would violate such rights. 1

III. THE SECTION 1985 CONSPIRACY
The cult deprogramming damage cases may well resolve the
single most compelling question left unanswered in Griffin v.
82
Breckenridge:
In the absence of a claim of racial discrimination
or the intention to interfere with the right of interstate travel,
what other rights were intended to be protected by the phrase
"equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws .. ."?' Justice Stewart made it clear in Grif434 U.S. 555, 568 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1978). The defendants in Procunier were state prison officials. In Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978),
the court rejected qualified immunity for state social workers and the mother of a
deaf mute who agreed to the mute's sterilization but accorded such immunity to
the physician who performed the surgery if he negligently interpreted the plaintiff's own communications concerning consent. 574 F.2d at 11-13. The Chief Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dissented on the
authority of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) and argued that since the
Supreme Court of the United States had extended qualified immunity to hospital
administrators, legislators, school officials, police officers, prison officials and executive officers, supra note 77, he failed to see "why one would doubt that social
workers would be included in this official continuum." 574 F.2d at 16. He also
would have extended a good faith defense to the private person "when his state
actor collaborator has not manifested sufficient bad faith to breach a qualified immunity." Id
11Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322.
' 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
11 The phrase "equal privileges and immunities under the laws .. ." does not

appear in sub-section 2 of § 1985. Sub-section 2 proscribes conspiracies to prevent
witnesses from testifying in the United States courts, to injure such a party or
witness on account of his having testified, to influence the verdict of any grand or
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fin v. Breckenridge that Section 1985(3) must not be transformed
into a general federal tort law, yet an inter-circuit split of authority on the issue of the rights to be protected raises serious
questions as to whether the Supreme Court's caveat is being ignored.
Many of the questions surrounding section 1985(3) litigation,
such as the requirement that a conspiracy must be pleaded and
proved, and that the defendants must have agreed to act in concert and in furtherance of a specific agreement were resolved in
the Griffin opinion." The Court also partially answered the question of what is meant by equal protection, or equal privileges or
immunities in the statute defining those terms as a requirement
"that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise classbased, invidiously dicriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action.""5 Later circuit cases following the Supreme Court's lead
petit jury to injure the juror on account of his verdict or to obstruct the due
course of justice "with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the
laws .... " The federal courts have uniformly construed the obstruction of justice
section of § 1985(2) as requiring the same class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus essential to a cause of action under sub-section 3. Dacey v. Dorsey, 568
F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1978); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). See also People ex rel. Snead v. Kirkland, 462 F.
Supp. 914, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
403 U.S. at 102-03.
8 403 U.S. at 102. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has commented:
[T]he statutory action is restricted to injuries inflicted upon the victim
because of his status as a member of an identifiable class; the statutory
'purpose to deprive of equal rights' requirement is inferred from the
racial or other class motivation underlying the tortious conduct....
Under Griffin, we think the class status providing the motivating
animus must be created by a fact other than possession of the right
deprived-otherwise virtually every conspiratorial deprivation of a
primary right would be actionable under § 1985(3).
Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1975).
A critical element of the holding in Weiss v. Patrick that the plaintiff failed
to prove her case under § 1985(3) was that she failed to show the existence of a
class-based animus:
While it may be true that Defendants disapprove of the views of the
Unification Church, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that this
factor alone translates into the required animus under § 1985(3). In fact,
it was shown, and this Court finds, that Defendant's actions were
primarily, if not entirely, motivated by the maternal concerns of Plaintiffs mother. Mrs. Weiss' [sic] actions, which resulted in her combination with Defendants, arose not from her abhorrence of the Unification
Church per se, but rather arose directly from the solicitude which a
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have uniformly established as a threshold requirement of proving a claim and availing oneself of the protection of this statute
a demonstration that the injuries were inflicted upon the victim
solely because of his status as a member of an identifiable and
protected class." It is settled that the statute affords protection
to one who has been invidiously discriminated against solely by
virtue of his membership in a bona fide religious group. 7 Nor
can it be debated seriously that once challenged by the defendants, it does not suffice for a plaintiff to simply rest on his
allegations that he was a member of a "religious group" and only
because of this was he the victim of the purposeful deprivation.
The plaintiff must be prepared to prove, and his cult must be
prepared to defend on cross-examination, the premise that it is
indeed a bona fide religion.8
A.

Purely Private Action: Which Rights Were Intended to be
Protected?

Given the burgeoning use of section 1985(3) as a general
federal tort law, the Supreme Court will soon have to decide
mother holds for her daughter's health and well-being. Defendants, as
agents of Mrs. Weiss, derived their motivations from this same maternal solicitude. Whenever an alleged conspirator's actions are directed
against one as an individual, and not because that individual is a
member of a particular class, a cause of action under § 1985(3) is not provided.
453 F. Supp. at 723-24, citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis in original).
1 Section 1985(3) protects "any person or class of persons .... " In Griffin,
Justice Stewart specifically avoided identifying other classes which would be entitled to protection under the statute. 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.9 (1975). While the majority made it clear that the class must be one which was historically intended to
be entitled to such protection, it refused to trace the "constitutionally permissible
periphery" of such classes or to define their scope. 403 U.S. at 107. The federal
courts have utilized either the "insular minority" requirement espoused in San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), or the related principle
that "some groups require and warrant special federal assistance in protecting
their civil rights." DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th
Cir. 1979). Compare United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA
(1938). The Fifth Circuit has found that members of a class of persons who have
had contract rights infringed were never meant to be protected. McClellan v.
Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 929 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Note, The
Class-BasedAnimus Requirement of 42 U.S. C. § 1985(c): A Suggested Approach,
64 MINN. L. REV. 635 (1980).
" Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973); Baer v. Baer, 450 F.
Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Jackson v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 414 F. Supp. 315
(E.D. Pa. 1976), affd without opinion, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977).
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what, if any, limitations ought to be placed upon the nature of
the rights sought to be protected by the original drafters of the
legislation. As Justice Stewart indicated in Griffin v. Breckenridge and as has been noted in several cult deprogramming damage cases, either racially motivated conspiracies or conduct intended to interfere with the right of interstate travel is action
able under the section and is not subject to the "under color of
state law" requirement.89 In the two deprogramming opinions in
which this issue has been addressed, the holdings are distinguishable because of the absence in one complaint and the inclusion in
the other of an allegation that the plaintiff was transported
against his will across state lines as part of the conspiracy." The
Rankin v. Howard court satisfied itself as to the presence of the
"right to interstate travel" element of the section 1985(3) cause
of action and therefore refused to go further in finding additional independent sources of congressional power such as state
action or the thirteenth amendment.9 The Baer Court, on the
other hand, having found no racial discrimination or interference
with the right to travel, undertook an exhaustive review of the
legislative history of the statute to conclude that when rights
originating specifically in the fourteenth amendment are sought
to be protected through the use of section 1985(3), the requirement of showing action taken under color of state law persists
and must be satisfied. 2
Reconciling Collins v. Hardyman93 with Griffin v. Breckenridge has never been difficult. In Collins, the Court held that
See notes 110-138 infra and accompanying text.
403 U.S. at 104-06.
In Baer v. Baer the plaintiff complained that he was "abducted while on a
street in Sausalito and was thereby deprived of his right 'to travel freely."' 450 F.
Supp. at 492. The court reasoned that the allegation that the plaintiff was deprived
of his right to travel freely on the public streets in no way established that his
federal right of interstate travel was impaired. It must be remembered that in
Griffin, in addition to being black, the petitioners were travelling on a federal
highway at the time they were set upon. In Rankin v. Howard, the plaintiff alleged
that the purpose of the conspiracy was to take him into custody and transport
him across state lines from Kansas to Arizona in order that he might be
deprogrammed. There, the court found that "the second ground for congressional
power stated in Griffin is clearly present in this case-[the] right to interstate
travel." 457 F. Supp. at 75.
91 Id.

450 F. Supp. at 493.
" 341 U.S. 651 (1951).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/5

24

Vermeire: "Deprogramming": From the Defense Counsel's Perspective
DEPROGRAMMING

1981]

section 1985(3) did not apply to a private conspiracy undertaken
by members of the American Legion who threatened members
of a certain political club with violence. The Court felt that Congress intended to protect first amendment rights, such as those
of assembly and free speech, against federal or state invasion
only, and not against purely private conspiracies." Thus under
Collins, if first amendment rights are indeed protected by the
enactment clause of the fourteenth amendment, only stateenforced conspiracies are actionable under the statute. To the
contrary, the Griffin Court never addressed this question
because its finding that state action was not required in respect
to every section 1958(3) claim was premised upon identifying the
congressional sources of power as the thirteenth amendment
and the right of interstate travel. The Supreme Court conspicuously avoided a discussion of the fourteenth amendment.95
While some commentators have taken the position that the legislative history of the congressional debates is inconclusive as to
whether Congress intended to protect against private conspiracies aimed at infringment upon all fourteenth amendment
rights", a close analysis of the drafters' intent reveals that
restriction of the use of the statute under those circumstances
to state-enforced discrimination is not only warranted, but indicated.
Having established a conspiracy and an invidiously classbased animus, the rights sought to be protected and claimed to
have been infringed must be isolated in the complaint. If the
discrimination is indeed racial or is intended to interfere with interstate travel, the court need look no further. If the right falls
under the umbrella of the first amendment or the fourteenth
amendment, a source of a congressional power must be identified to determine whether a purely private conspiracy is actionable. To suggest that infringement of the freedoms of assembly, association, religion, and free speech are "badges and inId. at 658-59.

',

, 403 U.S. at 107. Stewart, J., declared that the Court refused to decide
"whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than
racial bias would be actionable" under Section 19853). 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.9.
" Comment, The Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members, supra note
11, at 243; See generally G.S. Buchanan, The Questfor Freedom:A Legal History
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 331 (1975) [hereinafter referred
to as Buchanan, The Questfor Freedom].
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cidents of slavery" such that Congress could prohibit such
infringements under the thirteenth amendment and therefore
pursuant to the terms of section 1985(3), does violence to the
separate and individual bases for the establishment of those
rights and also preempts a discrete legislative function;
moreover, it presumes a judicial interpretation that must be left
only to the United States Supreme Court."
An entire review of the recorded legislative history surrounding the passage of the respective Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1871 reveals that many House and Senate leaders who had
advocated a broad view of congressional power in support of the
passage of the 1866 Bill either remained silent during the 1871
debates or actually reversed their position and advocated a narrow interpretation of the scope of the Act. in Baer, Judge Williams9" characterized such history as "equivocal,"99 and even
the most liberal of commentatotrs who have advocated an expansive reading of the statute have conceded that the debates
surrounding passage of the bill are "not conclusive as to
whether Congress intended to protect against private infringement of Fourteenth Amendment rights .... 100
No court has come to grips with this issue more authoritatively than Judge Spencer Williams in Baer v. Baer. Since that
' Justice Stewart believed that such a question must be deferred to Congress. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) he found that 42
U.S.C. § 1982, enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, reached private racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of real property and that Congress had such
power under the banner of "badges and incidents of slavery" inherent in the
power vested in it by the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment. Jones
went no further nor has the Supreme Court since then expanded the scope of the
definition of "badges and incidents of slavery" to include first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court forwent a chance to comment on this topic in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (extending the reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to private
schools that refused to enter into contractual relationships with the respondents
because of their race) but declined to do so. 427 U.S. 160, 167 n.6: . . . "the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is ...in no way here involved."
" Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom, supra note 96, at 339-40.
The debate in the House is reported at CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 141
(1871), and the Senate debate is reported at CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567
(1871).
, 450 F. Supp. at 496.
'® Comment, The Deprogrammingof Religious Sect Members, supra note
11, at 243.
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court's analysis, the Supreme Court decided in Great American
FederalSavings & Loan Ass'. v. Novotny' that section 1985(3)
creates of its own no substantive rights but "merely provides a
remedy for violation of the rights it designates." ' 2 The Supreme
Court went no further, however, and carefully avoided setting
forth exactly which rights were included. The narrow holding in
the case was that the section did not provide a remedy for violations of Title VII. 10 ' At least one concurring Justice clearly
believes that as to "other" privileges and immunities such as the
right to due process and the right to equal protection of the laws,
as contrasted to the right to engage in interstate travel and to
be free from the badges of slavery, protection is afforded under
the Constitution "only against state action."10 4 Indeed, Justice
Stevens directly endorsed the general Baer view that if private
persons engage in purely private acts of gender-based discrimination, they do not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and, thus, there can be no claim for relief
under Section 1985(3) based upon a violation of that amendment
if there is insufficient involvement by the state. "The rights
secured by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment are rights to protection against unequal
or unfair treatment by the State, not by private parties.' 0 5
This explication by Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
seems to put to rest the ingenuous and overbroad assertions by
some commentators that the section "permits actions against private persons for conspiracies which involve no state action...,""
Such assertions rely essentially on a 1975 Second Circuit opinion
reversing a dismissal of a section 1985(3) cause of action based
on private sex discrimination.'
101 442

U.S. 366 (1979).

442 U.S. at 372.
442 U.S. at 378.
442 U.S. at 384.
,' Id. In the other concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed and found that
the Constitution does not "create any right to be free of gender-based discrimination perpetrated solely through private action." Id. at 381.
11 LeMoult, DeprogrammingMembers of Religious Sects, supra note 10, at
639. Such assertions fail to consider that a valid § 1985(3) claim against persons acting in purely private capacity requires one of the two sources of congressional
power noted in Griffin v. Breckenridge: § 2 of the thirteenth amendment or the
right of interstate travel. See Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
"I Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 1975). In a recent
federal district court case by a male nursing director who brought suit against

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

The Baer reasoning has been examined in numerous federal
authorities since and has yet to be rejected. At least one court
has stopped short of holding that section 1985(3) provides no
remedy for private violations of the first amendment but has
done so only on the basis that the case could not be distinguished
from, and therefore was controlled by, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Novotny."8 In those opinions where the issue has been
squarely addressed, the courts have uniformly adopted the Baer
view and held that private conspiracies to infringe a first
amendment right, such as freedom of religion, are not actionable
under section 1985(3). 111 It is no longer open to serious debate.
the hospital and its administrators on a theory of sex discrimination pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the court relied upon Novotny and Baer and had "little difficulty in resolving the 19853) issues in defendant's favor." Daley v. St. Agnes
Hosp., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Relying on Judge William's
opinion in Baer, the court indicated "that it would be unsound for a federal court,
absent clear guidance from the Supreme Court, to decide this enormously complex question by holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to reach purely private conspiracies to violate First Amendment rights."
Baer's analysis has been followed in Williams v. Northfield Mt. Hermon School,
504 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Mass. 1981). In attempting to plead a cause of action pursuant to Section 1985(3), a former student sued a private boarding school and certain supervisors. The court found: "In order to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses, plaintiff must allege involvement
by the entity to which those clauses are addressed-the state." 504 F. Supp. at
1329-30. See also Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1980) rev'd, No.
80-1336 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1981); Selman v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp.
603 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1980); Carchman v.
Korman Corp., 456 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
I Daley v. St. Agnes Hosp., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In
Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff claimed
that the Ku Klux Klan was a religion and that he had been deprived of his right of
association by a private conspiracy under Section 1985(3). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed: "But we think the language of
equal protection chosen by the 1871 Congress cannot be interpreted to mean that
persons who conspire without involvement of government to deny a person the
right of free association are liable under this statute." 508 F.2d at 506-07. Judge
Craven found: "It is perfectly true that the first amendment now speaks to the
state by way of the fourteenth amendment, but to say that it also speaks to
private persons seems to us an innovation that must come from the Congress or
the Supreme court." but see Ward v. Connor, No. 80-1336, (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 1981).
Id at 507. Accord, Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.
1976); Whitten v. Petroleum Club, 508 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. La. 1981); Williams v.
Northfield Mt. Hermon School, 504 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Mass. 1981).
10 In Whitten v. Petroleum Club, 508 F. Supp. 765 (W.D. La. 1981), the court
relied upon Novotny, 422 U.S. at 380, and found it clear that private acts of
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"Members of cults who intend to allege under section 1985 infringements of the rights of free exercise of religion, association,
assembly, or any other first amendment right which speaks
through the fourteenth amendment must be prepared to prove
the same degree of state action that they must under a cause
pleaded pursuant to section 1983.
B.

The Plaintiffs Must Prove Membership in a Bona Fide
Religion

To simply claim that the plaintiff was the victim of an invidiously discriminatory conspiracy because of his membership
in the Unification Church, for example, is not enough. The mere
allegation that the plaintiff is a member of what he contends to
be a bonafide religious group cannot serve on its face to satisfy
the requirement that the class must be one which was intended
to be protected by Congress. It has recently been held that
homosexuals, 110 handicapped persons,' bankrupt debtors,11' and,
interestingly, deprogrammers are not persons who fall within
discrimination based on sex were not proscribed by Section 1985(3). Whitten, 508
F. Supp. at 772. In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974),
the court found the reasoning in Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971)
(en banc), which accorded first amendment protection as against wholly private
action, to be "an innovation that must come from the Congress or the Supreme
Court." 508 F.2d at 507. Cf. Life Ins. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that women constituted an appropriate class under § 1985(3), but not ruling
on whether Congress was authorized under the section to reach private
discriminatory practices by insurance companies). Id. at 505. "Moreover, few propositions are better established than that constitutional adjudication should be
avoided whenever possible. [citation omitted]. If the defendant insurance companies prevail in a trial on the merits, the constitutional issue need never be
reached." Id. at 506.
10 DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). The

court reasoned that it could not be said that homosexuals were historically afforded
special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights. 608 F.2d at 333.
"' Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (D. Kan.
1981).
112 McLellan v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1977).
"I Alexander v. Unification Church, 634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980). Curiously,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has affirmed without
opinion a district court holding that families who are harrassed and disrupted by
a particular religious group do not themselves constitute a valid class within Section 1985. Smith v. Armstrong, 396 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Tex.), affd without opinion,
524 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1975). Other "classes" which have been held not intended
to be protected are ones comprised of: doctors who testified adversely to other
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classes which Congress intended to protect as part of the overall
scheme of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Likewise, members of
cults which are not bona fide religions, but which have as their
primary and motivating purpose economic and political gain, are
not groups entitled to protection and therefore the members
cannot state a cause of action under section 1985(3).
In Rankin v. Howard, the defendants moved to compel the
plaintiff to answer questions during deposition which related
directly to the practices and customs of the Unification Church
in an effort to determine whether or not the cult was clearly
within the types of groups that were intended to be protected
under section 1985(3). The court found: "The case law is clear
that all groups are not protected merely because they claim a
group status," ' and went on to rule:
it is, therefore, apparent that § 1985 only extends to certain
identifiable groups, one of which is religious groups, of which
group the plaintiff claims to be a member. Since a determination of the defendants' defense rests upon their claim that the
group of which the plaintiff is a member is not a religion and is
not entitled to protection of § 1985, it is hereby ordered that
the Motion to Compel be granted and that defendant be allowed
to engage in all discovery directed toward determining the

validity of the group as a religion .... I's
Whether the Unification Church, in its own capacity and as a
model for other cults, qualifies as a bonafide religion is seriously
open to doubt in light of recent decisions. In May of 1981, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, denied tax exemptions on three buildings owned by the Unification Church in
New York City because of its extensive political and economic
doctors in medical malpractice cases, Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (lst Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); persons who are put on an employer's
blacklist because they filed workmen's compensation claims, Jacobson v. Indust.
Foundation, 456 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1972); and "non-white opponents of racism,"
Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1268 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
"' Rankin v. Howard, No. Civ. 77-790 (D. Ariz., April 11, 1979) (order granting defendant's motion to compel discovery). The court cited Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1975); Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216
(9th Cir. 1973); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Carchman v.
Korman Corp., 456 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Pa. 1978); and Western Telecasters, Inc., v.
Calif. Fed'n of Labor, 415 F. Supp. 54 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
" Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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activity. The court's majority also rejected the referee's finding
that the church was primarily engaged in religious matters.116
The members of the group testified as to their beliefs and their
dedication to the teachings of Reverend Moon and their activities on behalf of the group, telling of prayer meetings, discussion groups, fund raising and "evangelical duties."1"7 A representative of the Unificiation Church initially testified that he and
his associates engaged in no fund raising but subsequently conceded that the members had been requested to participate in
"mobile fund raising" which was designed as "evangelical
work."" 8 While the witness testified that the Unification Church
did not actively fund any political or economic activities, the
facts indicated that over $20,000 of the cult's checks were made
out to cash every month. The refereee found that the
petitioner's primary purpose was religious but that its theology,
as expressed in Moon's writings, bound it to a course of political
activity and that the properties in question were indeed not
used for religious purposes. 119 The primary basis for the
referee's ruling was that the Unification Church's energy was
directed toward political and economic activity, recruitment of
new members, and fund raising. 0
The appellate division agreed with the referee's recommendations but also specifically rejected his finding that the Unification Church's primary purpose was religious. The court concluded
"that political and economic theory is such a substantial part of
petitioner's doctrine that it defeats petitioner's claim that its
primary purpose is religious."'' Recognizing that a traditional
analysis of a purported religion is a sensitive and perilous undertaking and that courts are loath to inquire into the merits or
truth of any set of purported religious beliefs, the court noted
that it was compelled to conduct'a broad inquiry into the Unification Church's doctrine and activities in order to determine
whether it qualified for the tax exemption." The court examined
"I In re Holy Spirit Ass'n of the Unification of World Christianity v. The
Tax Comm'n of New York, 438 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1981). See also Holy Spirt
Ass'n v. Village of Tarrytown, 74 A.D.2d 916, 426 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
"I In re Holy Spirit, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
its Id.
I Id
"20

at 524.

Itt

121 Id.

at 525.

11 Id. at 526.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

the customs, practices, and beliefs of the group to determine
whether it exhibited the minimum requirements of a religion."
The court adopted both the Macintosh and Seeger definitions in
noting that unorthodoxy will not serve to disqualify a group
from the exemption.124 Allowing for the possibility that the creed
as found in the Divine Principle"' qualified as a theoretical doctrine purporting to establish a belief in a relationship between
God and man, the appellate division was similarly impressed
with the importance of the ChristianEchoes Nat'1 Ministry test
that the church must establish that it is organized or conducted
primarily for religious purposes and that other factors beyond
simply the purpose clause of the certificate of incorporation
must be examined, including the actual practices and customs of
the group."6
First, the court found that the "religious" content of the doctrine "and the leitmotif of religion with which the eclectic
teachings [were] tinged ... analyze[d] and instructed on politics
and economics . . . [and] ha[d] substantial secular elements."'
The mere use of the religious terminology in connection with the
politics and economics in the doctrine did not obscure the traditionally non-religious nature of these fields to the members of
the court. "Petitioner, by undertaking an adventure in semantics, is attempting to cloak politics and economics with the
blanket of religious dogma.""' 8
The reviewing court was further impressed with the type of
training that the members of the Unification Church went
through, including instructions on political and economic matters and the members' later involvement in many political and
13 Id.; See also Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d

849 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1972).
"'gSuch an examination is seemingly prohibited by United States v. Seeger,
38 U.S. 163 (1965) and by United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). In these
cases the United States Supreme Court held that "while the 'truth' of a belief is
not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is 'truly
held."' 380 U.S. at 184.
"' Both sides stipulated that the Divine Principle was regarded by members
of the Unification' Church as a religious revelation and testament. In re Holy
Spirit, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 526-27.
' Id. at 527.
Id. at 527.
"n

Id.
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economic activities which the petitioner asserted were simply
"incidental and insignificant to its primary and religious purpose,""In Four of the five judges ruling on the case disagreed.
They found that the non-religious activities of the Unification
Church were not merely incidental or peripheral but were "integral, inextricable and equally important as the religious ac-

tivities were to the mission of the Unification Church

.

..

.,130

The court provided important direction in how the judiciary
(and thus a properly instructed jury) can analyze a religious
creed without infringing upon the constitutional right of free exercise of religion. As is pointed out in United States v. Macintosh, neither court nor jury can determine the truth of the
theology espoused, but either can clearly analyze the creed to
determine whether it is primarily religious in content; they can
surely examine the practices, customs and duties of the
members."' Like the purported church seeking the protection of
state tax exemptions or an IRS section 501(c)(3) ruling, 132 a
member of a cult who brings a section 1985(3) action is seeking
the protection of a narrowly drawn federal remedial statute of
which he can not even begin to avail himself unless he is
prepared to demonstrate that his cult is indeed a bona fide
religion and not a political, social, or economic group. There can
be no clearer example of using the first amendment as a sword
as opposed to a shield. As the appellate division pointed out, by
denying the tax exemption to the petitioner, "this court is not
limiting petitioner's freedom to practice its beliefs and
disseminate its doctrines; rather, it is merely declaring that
petitioner is not organized and conducted in the manner required by law to entitle it to a tax exemption. " "
The Unification Church's activities have been just as
seriously questioned in its attempts to obtain a special use permit before the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Newcastle, New York, for the purpose of conducting a "religious retreat
129 Id

' ' 283 U.S. 605 (1931). Compare. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 at 184

(1965).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
In re Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax
Comm'n of New York, 438 N.Y.S.2d 521, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
11

in
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center." The Zoning Board of Appeals' concern was not whether
the Unification Church was a religious organization, because its
entitlement to the permit was "not dependent upon its dogmas,
its beliefs, its philosophies, its doctrines or its principles; it [was]
dependent upon its practices-what it will actually do with the
subject property."" 4 The board found that the Unification
Church was afforded a full and fair opportunity to counter or
refute the evidence that the workshops or seminars it intended
to conduct on the subject property were inextricably tied to a
regimen, practice, and procedure of indoctrinational thought
reform, and were also a form of psychological coercion which
deprived many of those upon whom it was visited their free will
or freedom of choice. The board found that the record was
replete with evidence that the participants in the Unification
Church's workshops were subjected to:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)

repetitive, lengthy and intensive doctrinal lectures constantly reinforced by group leaders or assigned sponsors;
physical isolation at remote and generally inaccessible
sites;
personal isolation from friends and family;
deprivations of privacy;
deprivations of time to relax or reflect;
physical labor;
rigorous and frenetic physical exercise;
often poor nutrition;
intolerance of criticism;
constant surveillance by assigned monitors;
ritualistic and frenzied games, chanting and shouting;
attacks on family and traditional values;
the promotion of group dependency;
constant and incessant expressions of love and affection
by assigned mentors, alternating with rejection and
disapproval, causing intense fear and anxiety; and
often those induced to attend the workshops were misled with respect to their sponsorship and objectives.

In re Application of the Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity 1979-25 at 4 (Zoning Board of Appeals, Town of New Castle, May 14,
1980), affd, No. 10657180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1981), appeal pending, (A.D.2d
1981).
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The Board concluded its analysis by finding that it appeared the
seUnification Church deliberately "seeks out and methodically
' 35
lects those most vulnerable to the techniques it employs."'
The term "religion" appears in the Constitution only twice:
article VI proscribes religious tests as a requirement of qualification to any office or public trust,' 6 and in the first amendment
which states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
,3, None of the major decisions of the Supreme Court which
....
have developed the test of a bona fide religious belief negate or
in any way contradict the propriety under section 1985(3) of
carefully analyzing a cult's tenets solely to determine whether
they are primarily religious in content, and scrutinizing the
customs, practices, and outside activities of the group to determine if it is entitled to protection by the statute.'3 8 Neither the
misplaced sincerity of a beguiled cult member nor the pedigree
of the group purporting to be a bonafide religion is relevant in
this determination. The plaintiff claiming membership in the
cult must carry his burden of proving that the group is a bona
fide religion both in its creed and its practices if he intends to
withstand a motion for a directed verdict at the close of his case.
C.

Who is the Real Party in Interest?

Common to the federal remedies pursued in cult damage
cases is a prayer for attorney's fees pursuant to section 1988.119
Although the successful defendants need not worry about such
exposure,"' parties should conduct discovery to determine who
"s

Id. at 9.

'= U.S. CONST.
"3

art. VI.

U.S. CONST. amend I.

'' Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
1- 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1974 & Supp. 1980). As amended in 1976, § 1988 permits reasonable attorney's fees to the "prevailing party." See note 8 supra.
", See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Lopez v.
Aransas County Ind. School Dist., 570 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit
has recently held that the organization which provides legal services is entitled
on behalf of the successful party it sponsors to recover legal fees directly. Dennis
v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980). By analogy, if the defendants are the
prevailing parties in a cult deprogramming damage case and can prove that the
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is the real party in interest, in the maintenance and funding of
the litigation. This should be done both in anticipation of a petition for section 1988 fees, as well as in an effort to dismiss the
suit unless the parties are properly reflected. In depositions and
interrogatories, it should be inquired whether the plaintiff's attorney's fees or costs are being funded or advanced by the cult
of which he is a member, or by some organization funded by his
group or in which the church participates. Regardless of whether
the payments are being made directly or through the plaintiff as
conduit, if the cult is financing the lawsuit it may very well be
more than a mere lender of money; it may be an actual subrogee
both prosecuting and controlling the litigation. In United States
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., the Supreme Court espoused the
view that a partial insurer or subrogee was a real party in interest and joinder should be compelled.'
Where the cult has a
direct and significant interest in the control of the litigation as
well as the outcome of the lawsuit, a motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
be filed.' It is uniformly held that courts will allow discovery in
connection with a rule 17(a) objection and "it even may be
necessary to take testimony to determine the relationship of the
persons involved to ascertain which of them is the real party in
interest, a procedure authorized for motions generally by rule
43(e).' 43 .
D.

ProceduralAspects of the Common Law Claims

The common law torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional harm,
arise under state law and, as such, will be controlled by the law
of the forum state." If the federal claims are dismissed because
the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim
cult organization is sponsoring and funding the litigation, such fees should be
recoverable directly from the cult. Cf. Int'l Oceanic Enterprises v. Menton, 614
F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980). See also note 167 infra.
1 338 U.S. 366, 380 (1949).

See e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill.
1969), affd on other grounds, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970); Shore v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 164 (D. Or. 1965).
141

1" 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1554 (1971 &

Supp. 1981).
"' Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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under sections 1983 and 1985(3), the claims will survive if there
is adequate and complete diversity of citizenship. Absent diversity, should the federal claims falter at the threshold and be
deemed insubstantial, there is no power in the federal courts to
hear the remainder of the state causes. The expedience of disposal of the federal claims pleaded and the degree to which the
federal courts have invested judicial energy in determining the
character of the claim will weigh importantly on the question of
substantiality.' Once it is established that the claim is not clearly insubstantial, federal courts have discretion to preserve and
determine the state claims under the banner of "conservation of
judicial energy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation
"146

Even if the plaintiff survives the primary test of determining whether the court has the power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction, the court should be urged to exercise its discretion
not to hear the remaining state claims based upon the present
policy in the circuit. Given the classical distinction between the
words "must" and "should," the teaching of the Court in United
Mineworkers v. Gibbs that "the state claims should be dismissed
as well" is generally followed in the district courts.'47
IV.

DAMAGES: THE CONTROLLING DOCTRINE OF
Carey v. Piphus

Once the cult member has proven his case under sections
1983 or 1985(3), he must be prepared to put on his proof on the
issue of actual injury, as plaintiffs are required to do in most
tort actions.' Justice Powell's opinion in Carey v. Piphus clear145 "Over the years-this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are
without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are
"'so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit .... "
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,536 (1974). Although the doctrine was characterized
by the Court as "more ancient than analytically sound," Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397 (1970), it reiterated in Hagans that it remained a federal rule and needed
no re-examination. 415 U.S. at 538.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. at 405.
" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1976); See also Lawson
v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Belshaw v. Credit Bureau of
Prescott, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62 (D. Ariz. 1975).
",Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The right infringed was the right to
due process; the plaintiff, a student, had been given a 20 day suspension without a
hearing for alleged violation of the school rule against the use of drugs.
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ly established that the common law of torts is the basis for all inquiries into damage actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871
and that compensation for injuries under general tort principles
is the proper standard to use in measuring damage awards
under these statutes. Furthermore, and most importantly, the
court found that money damages must not be presumed merely
because an abstract violation of a constitutional right such as
due process has been demonstrated." 9 In light of this opinion,
there simply cannot be money compensation for a constitutional
wrong without proof of actual injury. While it has been questioned
whether the "actual injury" requirement applies to constitutional violations outside the one right which was discussed in
Carey (procedural due process), later opinions in the lower
federal courts have extended this reasoning to include all constitutional violations.' 5'
Although mental and emotional distress is compensable, the
plaintiffs must be put to their proof of actual injury in this
regard. 5' While the Supreme Court sanctioned the awarding of
nominal damages not to exceed one dollar, without such proof of
actual injury,"' later federal decisions have interpreted the
"I "First, it is not reasonable to assume that every departure from procedural due process, no matter what the circumstances or how minor, inherently

is as likely to cause distress as the publication of defamation per se is to cause injury to reputation and distress." 435 U.S. at 263.
150In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth
Circuit felt that the rationale of Carey "similarly requires an award of nominal
damages upon proof of infringement of a fundamental First Amendment liberty."

In this case, the right to associate freely with members of an organization was infringed. There was no actual demonstration of injury and, accordingly, the court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.
Accord James v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 484 F. Supp. 705, 714 (S.D. Ala. 1979).

,' Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 266: "It remains true to the principle that
substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury .... "
Earlier, the court foresaw no difficulty in requiring the plaintiff to produce

evidence that mental or emotional distress was actually suffered and caused by
the denial of the procedural due process itself. "Distress is a personal injury
familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances

of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff." Id. at 264. In the footnote supporting
this statement, Justice Powell, pointed out that juries must be appropriately instructed in this regard and that a claim of genuine injury "must be supported by
competent evidence concerning the injury. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974).". 435 U.S. at 264 n.20.
1

The Court found that the denial of procedural due process "should be ac-

tionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. We therefore hold
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Supreme Court's direction as mandating an award of no more
than one dollar for the abstract injury.5 3 While it is true that the
phrase "actual injury" -is not tantamount to physical impact, a
claim of emotional or mental suffering must be substantiated
upon actual injury grounds if the plaintiff is to avoid a nominal
damage jury instruction."' If the plaintiff has not actually suffered an emotional injury provable by some independent means,
there should be no surprise at the giving of such an instruction.
There is an interesting dichotomy between the availability
of the qualified good faith defense which gives the defendants
immunity and the finding of "bad faith" by the jury which would
expose those same defendants to exemplary or punitive damages.
While Justice Powell made it clear in Carey v. Piphus that there
is no evidence that Congress "meant to establish a deterrent,
more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages . . .,,11 he also recognized that exemplary or
punitive damages might be awarded in a proper
case under section 1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing
violations of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court was
specific in neither approving nor disapproving any of the cases
allowing the jury to be instructed on punitive damages in
federal civil rights actions.1"
What is clear from the recent federal opinions that have
relied upon reasoning in Carey v. Piphus is that a two-step approach is proper if the Supreme Court in the future specifically
sanctions the award of exemplary damages in civil rights actions. The qualified good faith defense yielding immunity is
wholly distinct from the actual malice or bad faith requirement
that if, upon remand, the District Court determines that respondents' suspensions
were justified, respondents nevertheless will be entitled to recover nominal
damages not to exceed one dollar from petitioners." 435 U.S. at 267 (emphasis added).
. Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d at 402; Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d
997, 1021 (5th Cir. 1979); Newman v. Bd. of Educ., 594 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1979); Burt
v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1978); James v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 484 F. Supp.
705, 714 (S.D. Ala. 1979).

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 264.
435 U.S. at 256-57.
', 435 U.S. at 257, n.11. The Court noted that there was no basis for such an
award in the case being discussed because the district court had found that the
petitioners did not act with the malicious intention to deprive the respondents of

their rights or to do them any other" injury.
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that permits the issue of punitive or exemplary damages to go
to the jury. First, a compensatory award in a section 1983 or
1985(3) action is appropriate only when the defendants have
acted with "impermissible motivation or with such disregard of
the [plaintiff's] clearly establishedconstitutionalrights that [the]
action[s] cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good
'
This must be the first standard since the finding that
faith."157
the defendants, in fact, acted in good faith unquestionably provides them with immunity. Secondly, the trial court must determine at the directed verdict juncture whether there is sufficient
evidence of malicious, intentional, outrageous, or improperly
motivated conduct by the defendants. If there is, the jury should
be instructed that if they find that the defendants are not entitled
to a qualified good faith immunity defense, the question of
malicious, intentional, or wanton conduct must be considered
separately, and the absence of the immunity defense does not
necessarily require a finding of improper motive for bad faith."5 8
Should a jury deny the defendants the qualified good faith
defense immunity, but also find that the defendants were not
maliciously motivated, their only award can be compensatory
damages for actual injury provable by independent evidence.
The requirement of finding bad faith conduct has served as
the sine qua non not only for exemplary and punitive damages,
but for attorney's fees as well. In McNamara v. Moody, 5 ' the
"ISMorris v. Travisona, 528 F.2d 856, 858 n.5 (1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis in
original), cited in LaPlante v. Southworth, 484 F. Supp. 115 (D.R.I. 1980); see also
Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir. 1976); Rodriquez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394
(5th Cir. 1976). See discussion of good faith immunity note 75 & 155 supra and accompanying text.
'1 This distinction is clearly drawn in recent federal decisions and was
recognized by Justice Powell in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 257 n.11, where
there was found no basis for an award of punitive damages because the petitioners did not act "with a malicious intention to deprive respondents of their
rights or to do them other injury .. " In Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 916
(N.D. Tex. 1979), the court found that punitive damages could be awarded under
the civil rights statutes where the trier of fact found that the plaintiff was entitled to receive compensatory damages and where the act that proximately caused

the injury to the plaintiff "was maliciously, wantonly or oppresively done." Recent federal opinions have characterized the prerequisites for an instruction on

punitive damages to include at a minimum: a demonstration of wanton or oppressive acts, Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1979); malice, James v. Bd. of

School Comm'rs, 484 F. Supp. 705, 714 (S.D. Ala. 1979); and outrageous conduct,
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1381 (D. Mass. 1979).
9 606 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Fifth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of section 1988 and
found that it "casts some doubt on [the] conclusion" that nominal
damages may serve as the basis of an award of attorney's
fees." 160 The court's rationale was premised upon a footnote to
the Senate Report promising attorney's fees against officials in
their individual capacity only upon a finding that they had acted
in bad faith.16' While Perez v. Univ. of Puerto Rico is one of
several reported circuit court opinions upholding attorney's fees
where the award is only of nominal damages of one dollar with
no other form of remedy such as equitable or declaratory relief,
other federal courts have followed the "substantial benefit or
essential success" tests."2 The Supreme Court has observed that
"[n]othing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District
Court's power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on
a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been
violated ... ."I' But it has also noted that a prevailing standard
'" The Fifth Circuit questioned dicta in Perez v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 600
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) to the effect that nominal damages alone could serve as the
basis for an award of attorney's fees. In Perez, the court noted that the bare
award of one dollar nominal damages with nothing more should be a factor taken
into consideration by a district court in determining whether to award attorney's
fees but the fact of a mere nominal award should not bar the litigant's right to
petition for attorney's fees. In Milwe v. Cayuoto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981), the
court found a one dollar award against a law enforcement officer sufficient to support recovery of attorney's fees, but did not satisfactorily explain its earlier and
contradictory view that a one hundred dollar award is "only a moral victory of insufficient magnitude to warrant an award under § 1988." 653 F.2d at 84, quoting,
Huntley v. Community School Bd., 579 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1978).
" Footnote 7 to the Senate Report states: "Proof that an official had acted
in bad faith would also render him liable for fees in his individual capacity, under
the traditional bad faith standard recognized by the Supreme Court inAlyeska ......
S. REP. [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913. The Supreme Court held
in Alyeska Pipe Line Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975), that state and
local officials should not be subject to individual liability for attorney's fees unless
they acted in bad faith according to the American common law. Thus, it would appear reasonable to conclude that if the award of one dollar nominal damage is
premised upon the absence of bad faith, neither the state actor nor the private individuals should be liable for attorney's fees.
"62See note 160 supra. The "substantial benefit test" is set forth in Coyote v.

Roberts, 502 F. Supp. 1342 (D.R.I. 1980); the "essential success test" is discussed
in Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 620 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1980) and Bagby v. Beale, 606
F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1980).
"I Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). In Gagne, the petitioner settled by
reason of a consent decree with no determination that her constitutional rights
had been violated. The Senate Report to the Bill (§ 1988) expressly contemplated
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for the award of such fees is "a determination of the substantial
rights of the parties .. .."I" With this direction in mind, it can
fairly be stated that no federal court has gone so far as to award
attorney's fees where the ultimate and complete outcome of the
litigation was simply a nominal damage award of one dollar with
no equitable or declaratory relief."' It would be difficult for a
a consent judgment being entered against the defendants serving as the proper
basis for the award of fees. Id.In McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F. Supp. 38 (W.D.
Va. 1978), a consent decree was entered prior to a consideration or ruling on the
merits of the case. The court held that a party need not win by way of a full trial
on the merits to be said to have prevailed, "but the lawsuit must have resulted in
or been the catalyst of a victory for the party of the class it represents." Id. at 41.
The court reasoned that federal courts had uniformly allowed attorney's fees to
plaintiffs "who have successfully terminated litigation by settlement prior to
trial." Id. An examination of each case cited, however, reveals that there had
been some form of declaratory, injunctive or other equitable relief awarded in
each case. Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977) (injunction); Howard
v. Phelps, 443 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1978) (preliminary injunction); Hartmann v.
Gaffney, 446 F. Supp. 809 (D.Minn. 1977) (consent decree requiring the State
defendants to maintain the plaintiff's present level of hospital privileges and express reservation of attorney's fees to be ruled upon by court); Mental Patient
Civil Liberties Project v. Hosp. Staff, 444 F. Supp. 981 (E. D. Pa. 1977) (consent
judgment); and Buckton v. NCAA, 436 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Mass. 1977) (injunction
and consent decree).
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
18 See discussion of the Second Circuit's view note 160 supra. Numerous
federal courts have indicated reluctance to grant attorney's fees absent some
form of relief other than the mere award of one dollar. Jones v. Diamond, 594
F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979); Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Williams v. Gen. Food Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974). It
would be very difficult for the plaintiff awarded only one dollar to contend that
such a nominal award "clearly accomplished the goals of the suit." McManama v.
Luckhard, 464 F. Supp. at 41.
Indeed, in the opinions allowing attorney's fees after an award of only one
dollar nominal damages, the award has been coupled with either injunctive,
equitable or declaratory relief. See Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th
Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs successful in having a Texas statute declared unconstitutional and they were awarded $1.00 damages); Pickett v. Milam, 579 F.2d 1118
(8th Cir. 1978) (both declaratory and injunctive relief justified award of fees
although no actual money damages awarded). In the "Operation Zebra" case,
Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980), a preliminary injunction was
issued in district court and attorney's fees were awarded as a matter of law after
two black males successfully challenged the San Francisco Police Department's
policy of stopping and frisking black men who appeared to resemble the composites of the "Zebra killers." While the appeal was pending, four persons were
convicted and sentenced and the investigation ceased. The Ninth Circuit dismissed
the appeal as moot. Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1977). The petitioners successfully moved for attorney's fees and defendants appealed. Because
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plaintiff to claim that merely by obtaining a one dollar award he
had successfully achieved an essential purpose of his litigation
or that he had derived a substantial benefit other than forcing
the defendants to stand trial. Indeed, such a plaintiff may be
viewed as being quite "unsuccessful" if he had previously rejected a timely offer of settlement and succeeds only in recovering one dollar.'66 Moreover, it is clear that successful or "prevailing defendants are likewise entitled to attorney's fees."'6 7
V.

CONCLUSION

The religious cult deprogramming damages cases have provided imaginative and progressive analyses of the critical questions of: judicial immunity, qualified good faith immunity, derivthe appellees had succeeded on a "significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] ...
the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit ..... the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the award. 625 F.2d at 847, citing Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d
894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980).
"I Because of the uncertainty as to the propriety of attorney's fees awards
after settlement, and because § 1988 damages are authorized "as part of the costs
"see note 8 supra, litigants should be cautious in making an offer of judgment
....
under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant
part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the
effect specified in his offer, with costs then accured.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (emphasis added).
Although there are no reported decisions analyzing the effect of a Rule 68 offer of $1.00 judgment once accepted and a § 1988 petition, it would appear that
since the offer must be "with costs then accured," attorney's fees post-acceptance
are proper. In Perkins v. New Orleans Athletic Club, 429 F. Supp. 661 (D. La.
1976), the district court found a basis for the award of attorney's fees following
the acceptance of an offer of judgment where the offeror conceded even a bit of
the relief prayed for, but there was no discussion of civil rights nominal damages.
In Sheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo.1978), the court noted that the offer
must include attorney's fees and that Rule 68 simply did not permit the offeror to
designate which accrued costs he was willing to pay.
'"lilt is beyond dispute that prevailing defendants are eligible for an award
of [attorney's] fees under.. . § 1988, see Milburn v. Girard, 455 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). . ." Hughes v. Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia, 509 F. Supp. 140, 141
(E.D. Pa. 1981). See also Patzkowski v. United States, 576 F.2d 134, 139 (8th Cir.
1978) and Fantroy v. Greater St. Louis Labor Council, 511 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Mo.
1980): "A showing of bad faith on plaintiff part is not a sine qua non for allowance
of attorney's fees, but is merely one of several factors which the Court should
evaluate in exercising its discretion under § 1988." 511 F. Supp. at 72.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

43

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 5

134

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

ative immunity accorded to lay co-conspirators who allegedly act
in concert with a civilly immune judge, restrictions of the scope
of the remedial civil rights conspiracy statutes and the important touchstones by which the claim of a bona fide religion can
be measured. Because of the novel and controversial nature of
the deprogramming remedy sought by parents of cult members,
the amount and quality of litigation remain quite high.
Once the procedural and substantive federal jurisdictional
issues have been settled, however, there remains at the center
of all such litigation an evaluation of the cultist's freedom of
choice and freedom of thought. The deprogrammers and parents
seek to restore such freedoms; the cult member seeks to convince the jury that the freedom was never lost.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss1/5

44

